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!.erIIls of reference and composition of the Review :Body
1.. The Independent Review :Body was appointed by the Commission in
January 1979 with the following terms of reference:
".... In view of the changing character of the Community and the
different categories of task the Commission will face in the 1980s
to examine how the Commission s organization and staff resources can
best be adjusted to meet future needs, and thus cope with a rapidly
changing workload in the light of defined priorities..
.... 
With the objective of maintaining  e,  permanent Community civil
service of the highest quality, to e:xa.mine the ways in which the
Commission can further develop its policies in respect of staff
recrui tment , career development and provisions for retirement..
2.. Ambassador D..P.. Spierenburg chaired the Review :Body, and
Mr K.. :Buschma:rm , Mr Po Delouvrier , Mr Go Petrilli and Mr D.. Taverne
were appointed member.
3,. The Review :Body was assisted in its work by Mr NoEH
Secretary General , lVlr :Baichere , Director-General for Personnel and
Administration, NT Cardon de Lichtbuer and NT Verheyden, general
Rapporteurs , and Mr Lambert and NT Olivier 7 to whom the Review :Body
entrusted in particular a study on questions of administrative
organization.. Mr Nuttall was Secretary..
Or~ization ,of ,the work
4.. We held meetings on twenty days between February and
September 1979, at which we had discussions with Members of the
Commission, senior officials and representatives of the Trades Unions
and Professional Organizations.. In addition, the Chairman and
Members of the Review Body individually had many private contacts with
a wide range of opinion both inside and outside the Commission, and
in particular with Commission staff at all levels..-2-
5.. Two meetings were held to e:x:change views with the Three Wise
Men appointed by the European Council to examine the workings of
the Community institutions..
Layout of the Report
The Report is divided into three parts.. The first consists
of general observations , which give our view of the Commission
fundamental role in the interplay of Community institutions and
the effectiveness with which it carries out that role. These
observations set out the principles on which are based the second
and third parts of the Report , of which the former deals with the
organization and structure of the college itself and of its
~ervioes , while the latter discusses administrative policy.
7.. In the second part of the Report , we recommend keeping the
number of Commissioners to a strict minimum, and dividing among
them portfolios of comparable weight.. The Presidency should be
reinforced to allow it to e:x:eroise effective coordination of the
Commission Services and ensure a better distribution of staff..
The number of administrative units should be reduced, and the
position of Directors-General further strengthened..
In the third part of the Report , we put forward a package of
measures designed to iIIlprove administrative efficiency and to give
staff more regular caT.eer prospects , while ensuring that the
Commission can benefit from a current of outside experience.
There are also proposals for encouraging mobility of staff among
the Commission services and placing greater emphasis on management
qualities - 3-
Part One : General Observations
The Commission plays a vi tal and unique role among the
institutions of the European CoIDIIlunity. It must represent the
interest of the Community as a whole. That is why under the
Treaty it is responsible for making proposals to the Council of
Ministers , which cannot deliberate in their absence.. It also
administers important ~eas of Community policy. Whatever view
is held about the future development of the CoIDIIluni ty, it is in
everyonets interest that the Commission should perform its many
tasks efficiently and effectively..
10.. In order to carry out these tasks , the Commission is assisted
by an Administration whose structure and organization .are inevitably
comple:x:.. It is staffed 'by officials from nine different countries
with their own traditions and styles of administration, and works in
si:x: different languages.. Among these different factors the
Commission seeks to preserve some kind of balance, and to forge the
officia.ls into a European civil service.. Moreover , the Commission
depends for the resources which it needs to perform its tasks on the
Council and on Parliament , which authorize, not an overall
appropria. tion for staff E'acpendi ture t bu -t; a specific number of posts
at different levels.
11.. The total number of Commission employees is smaller than is
generally realised.. E:x:cluding staff paid fromresearoh
appropriations , it amounts to 8.. 300 officials , of whom some 40%
are directly or indirectly concerned with linguistic work*o Taken
as a whole , these numbers do not seem e:x:cessi ve when compared with
national central administrations..
12.. In carrying out its work the Commission is therefore subject to
a number of constraints. In spite of these, and of the inherent
difficul ties of its task, one should not underestimate the success
of the Commission in fulfilling its duties under the Treaty  These
results could not have been obtained without a generally devoted and
See Anne:x: I..- 4-
capable staff. In the years since the founding of the Community
the proposals worked out by the Commission have led to the customs
union, the common agricultural policy, free movement of persons and
the common commercial policy.. The Commission has applied an effective
competition policy.. It has played an important part in the GATT
negotiations and made an essential contribution to the new type of
relationship which has been evolved with developing countries..
The present Commission , and more particularly its President , have
been tireless in urging greater monetary cooperation, and it is of
great poli tical importance that through its President the Commission
takes part in the European Council and the economic summits..
13.. But these remarkable successes should not blind us to the fact
that over the last ten years the Commission s influence , effectiveness
and reputation have declined.. This has been partly for erlernal
reasons, which lie principally in a change in the political and
economic environment , and which are not the concern of this Report.
14. Some of the difficulties the Commission faces are outside its
control; we have referred to them in para.. 10.. Other constraints
I ts members have derive from the nature of the college itself..
widely varying political 'backgrounds , are not likely to know each
other personally before their appointment and do not necessarily
complement each other.. Finally, the President of the Commission
can control them only to the erlent of his personal authority,
since he is only  .E!imus inter pares
15.. Nevertheless there are internal weaknesses , of which the
present Commission is well aware; hence the appointment of our
group to review its organization and workings and suggest reforms..
16.. We have found that there is a certain lack of cohesion in the
college of Commissioners , an imbalance between portfolios
insufficient coordination among senior officials , a maldistribution
of staff between departments , and. shortcomings in the career
structure of the civil service of the Commission.. The fact 
that the Commission is being managed in a manner and with techniques
which are inappropriate in present circumstances and can only be more
so after further enlargement.."'5-
17 .. Since the entry into the Community of Ireland, Denmark and the
Uni ted Kingdom and the increase in the number of Commissioners from
9 to 13, the importance and workload of the portfolios given to the
different Commissioners have inevitably varied. Some portfolios
have grown in iIIlportance. Others , some newly created , have not yet
realised their full potential.. This imbalance in the importance of
different portfolios is not conducive to the cohesion of the college.
At the same time there has been a tendency for responsibilities to
be personalised and the outside world has sometimes 'been left with
an impression that the Commission as such lacks a sense of collective
purpose and a taste for joint action, with the consequence that
priori ties and selectivity in the development of the Commission
programme of work are not as clearly established as they should be.
18. The lack of adequate coordination among Members of the Commission
and a certain lack of encouragement from them for central coordination
and planning among senior officials are particularly evident.. The
result has been a lack of structural coordination among
Directors-General and a growing emphasis on the roles of the
personal staffs of Commissioners..
19. While the total amount of work has ine:x:orably groWn , the
distribution .of staff between Directorates-General does not
accurately reflect the differential growth of departmental burdens..
A reallocation of staff between Directorates-General , and sometimes
even between Divisions wi thin Directorates-General , has proved
difficult to achieve , and has intensified the problem of a lack of
mobili ty on the part of officials.
20.. Furthermore , for reasons of the distribution of age based on
the accident of time at which they were recruited , relatively few
top civil servants will retire in the next six: years.. As a
result  prospects for promotion are at present poor and morale has
inevitably suffered"- 6 
....
21.. Other factors affect morale.. Managerial inadequacies in
the Commission Services inevitably lead to dissatisfaction among
the staff.. The failure of the Council to adopt proposals which
have required months of hard work to prepare is the source of
much frustration.. Finally, the 11IDi ted scope of ma.ny officials
work and their e:x:oessive specialisa.tion, their lack of information
about Commission poliqy in general and especially the feeling that
they are too remote from the decision makers, all act as
disinoentives..
22. We believe that these weaknesses need to be urgently remedied.
The energy crisis provoked by difficulties in the supply of oil
inflation, unemployment and the restructuring of industry forced by
the emergence of rapidly developing co'Untries a.re presenting the
world in general and our countries in particular and the Community
insti tutions with 'Unprecedented problems.. Moreover , the imminent
enlargement of the Community can only complicate the difficulties..
23" As regards the most noteworthy developments which have occurred
in re()entyea.rs in the institutional structure of the Community -
the creation of the European Co'Unoil and the direct election of the
European Par liament 
.... 
they have in no way changed the tasks and the
powers entrusted to the Commission by the Treaty..
24.. For all theserea.sons , the Commission must be able to act as a
real college , strong, resourceful and efficient , in order to be in a
posi tion to play its full part in the dialogue with the Council and
the Parliament..
25.. The reforms we propose in this report will have to be decided
on by a variety of Community bodies" We commend them for urgent
implementation to the Commission , the governments of the Member
States and the representatives of the people of the Community in
the European Parliament..- 7-
Part Two : The Commission and its Services
The Commission : role
26. The ability of the Commission to carry out successfully the
duties assigned to it by the Treaties , and in particular to
e:x:ercise its powers of initiative , is , then , of supreme importance..
Enlargement of the CoIlll1l1U1i ty may multiply administrative problems
but it must not be allowed to weaken the e:x:ercise of these powers.
21. The Commission e:x:ercises its powers of initiative by making
formal proposals to the Council. In formulating these proposals
it can ask the opinion of government officials , industry and the
Tra.d.EB Unions , but must ensure that these discussions do not turn
into prenegotiations in which the proposals lose their specific
nature and already become compromises at this stage.. The real
debate begins within the Council on the basis of formal proposals
from the Commission as provided for in the Treaty.. Informal
discussion papers , such as the Commission has tended to send to
the Council in recent years , should only be resorted to in order to
give a coherent general explanation of a new policy which is then
given concrete form through a series of formal proposals. The
Commission may, of course , amend its proposals after they have been
sent to the Council , but even so should avoid compromise for its own
sake..
28. In order to put its proposals in a general perspective , the
Commission must draw uP, in the work programme it presents to the
European Parliament , specific objectives and priori ties to be
reviewed at regular intervals.
.. 
It must indicate the policies it
intends to follow to attain these objectives as well as the means
which it will require..
29.. The Commission must act as a college. This means that on all
important matters decisions can only p.e taken following a debate in
the college, and they commit the Members of the Commission. At the
same time , the Commission must be aware of the political role
conferred on it by the Treaties , its responsibility as their
guardian and its duty to explain continuously to public opinion the- 8-
decisions which are taken. This is the only way in which the
Commission can lose its present technocratic image.
The Commission : portfolios
30.. The Commission organizes its work by assigning portfolios to its
Members; in other words each Commissioner is responsible for a given
sector and thus for the corresponding services.. The number of
portfolios has therefore varied with the number of Members of the
Commission.. Each time a new Commission has been appointed , the
make-up of the portfolios has gi~en rise to protracted discussion
resulting ina redistribution of portfolios , which ha~e been of
unequal weight.. These fluctuations have led to uncertainty about
where services belong, with damaging effects on their efficiency..
310 The system of portfolios is not in question, and indeed seems
to be the only sensible way of organizing the work of the Commission
and of its Services  But the number of portfolios cannot be
increased indefinitely without losing coherence. For the system
to work smoothly, duties must be shared out more or less equally
among Commissioners (to avoid internal friction and frustration) and
the division of portfolios must be stable. This is not the case
today.
32.. Some portfolios , like erlernal relations and agriculture , are
clearly homogeneous and of considerable importance.. If the other
portfolios are to be of comparable importance , their number must be
limited.. We have made a careful e:x:amination of ways of dividing
up the Commission s present areas of activity.. This has shown
that in a Community of Nine , soon to become Ten , there is not scope
for more than eight portfolios of sufficient content.. When Spain
and Portugal join, there could be a small increase in this number
especially since the workload and importance of some services are
likely to grow. In that case , there should not be more than ten
portfolios.. To create artificially a greater number would mean
that some portfolios would be lightweight , and would introduce a- 9-
distinction between first-and second-class portfolios.
addition, the greater the nUIIlber of portfolios , the more difficult
coordination becomes , whereas good coordination is essential for
the efficient operation of the college.
The rCoIIlIDi ion : work-programming and coordination
33. If the portfolio system is not to weaken the collegiate nature
of the Commission, it must be accompanied by strong coordination
procedures and proper machinery for arbitrating between the claims of
competing sectors. Coordination within the Commission i tselfis at
present insufficient.. It cannot be replaced by coordination at
administrative level , which is then too often a formality and takes
place at too late a stage in the decision-making process..
34.. Effective coordination at the pori tical level can be achieved
by systematic and permanent working parties of Commissioners with
the participation of Serviceso This has been tried in various
forms but , since the merger of the e:x:ecutives in 1967, has not given
the results hoped for , because of the heavy workload of Members of
the Commission and because no-one was made officially responsible for
seeing that coordination actually took place..
35.. These drawbacks could be remedied by a Presidency actively
responsible , with the right organizational backing, for directing
ooordination.. This has never been tried as a regular system
al though successive Presidents have intervened when no agreeIIlent
can otherwise be reached.. However , to achieve systematic
day-to-day coordination, involving Commissioners and Services
would place too great a personal burden on the President , who
devote himself to the other tasks of the Presidency 1 which are
becoming more and more onerous as the Community developso
alike
must also
36. The President should therefore be assisted by a Member of the
Commission who alone would exercise the functions of Vice-President..
They would together form a strengthened Presidency, which would
improve the allocation of resources , make for a better selection of- 10 -
priorities and improve the general functioning of the Commission..
They would control all horizontal services. How the various tasks
were shared out between them would depend on the personal
preferences of the two individuals, but it would be logical for
the President to be responsible for presiding over the Commission
and representing it in important matters both inside and outside the
Communi tyand for the Vice-President to be responsible for work
programming, coordination and supervision of the organization
(matching of available resources with work to be done).. He would
also be the permanent deputy to the President. The Vice-President 9 
key role Vlould be his responsibility for coordination. The right
procedures for this will have to be worked out and approved by the
Commission; they will include frequent meetings with Commissioners
and Dire.ctors-Genera.l t and the fle:x:ible use of ad hoc working
parties on major topics.
The Commission: composition
37.. We note that Article 10 of the Merger Treaty provides that the
Commission must include at least one national of each of the Member
States , but may not include more
nationali ty of the same state.
Commission, at present fixed at
Council acting unanimously.
than two members having the
The number of Members of the
thirteen, may be altered by the
38.. Immediately before 1973 , the Commission was composed of nine
Members with eight portfolios , there being two Members of the
Commission from each of the larger Member states. At the first
enlargement t this principle was continued by adding two Commissioners
from the United Kingdom and one each from Denmark and Ireland.
These thirteen Members share twelve portfolios.. (The President
does not normally have a portfolio of his own.. If the same
principle continues to be applied in the future , the enlargement of
the Community to include Greece Spain and Portugal will lead to a
Commission of seventeen Members (of whom one would be Greek, two
Spanish and one Portuguese) sharing si:x:teen portfolios.
39. We believe that such a large Commission would be undesirable..... 11 
A Commission of fewer Members is preferable because:
(i) a smaller Commission will ensure better coordination;
(ii) it will enable matters to be more thoroughly .discussedand
facilitate clear conclusions;
(iii) it can constitute a genuine team and allow its Members to
have a better personal knowledge of each other , thus creating
a better collegiate spirit;
(iv) it will project a better image of itself;
(v) for the reasons we have already given, it will not be possible
in a Community of Nine or Ten to create more than eight
portfolios of genuine content and equal weight to be divided
among the Commissioners (leaving aside the functions of
President and Vice-President), nor later in a Community of
Twelve to create more than ten portfolios"
40.. Against this position and in favour of a larger Commission the
following arguments have been put to us:
(i) that, especially after further enlargement of the Community,
Commissioners will be required to travel more frequently over
greater distances and that e:x:tra demands will be made on them
by the increased need , in the wake of direct elections , to
cultivate political links with their country of origin and
with Parliament;
(ii) the dispersal of the Communityts activities in three
different places will continue , with its attendant barriers
to efficient functioning;
(iii) political considerations might argue in favour of a larger
Commission, which would allow the relative size of the Member
States and the political balance in them to be reflected in
the composition of the Commission"- 12 -
41.. The difficulties arising from the Commissioners' heavy
workload can be countered by observing an order of priorities in
their duties.. The three tasks which should be given priority are
work in the college , relations with the Council and relations with
the Parliament.. Other tasks , for example representative engagements
in the home country 7 poEtical contacts and preparing the ground for
Commission proposals during tours of capitals , could be performed
by making more use of high level cabinets t especially for political
contacts t and by upgrading the role of the Directors-General to
relieve .Members of certain tasks directly concerned with the
management of their portfolios..
42.. As regards the political arguments , we note that the Treaties
specifically provide for national weighting in two Community
institutions , in the Council by weighted voting and in the Parliament
by differentiated numbers of seats.. No such specific provisions
enst for the Commission and the Court which are both more
particularly concerned with safeguarding the Community interest 
The assumption that Members of the Commission should in some way
represent the points of view of the Member States whose nationals
they are runs counter to their obligation of independence.. Indeed
the Commission s role of defining the interest of the Community as
such does not require the number of Members to be weighted by
nationality.. As regards the political composition of the college
it is up to goverrnnents to continue their previous practice of
concertation"
43.. We therefore believe that the arguments for a small Commission
of twelve Members (one from each Member State), must prevail over
those for a larger Commission of, for example , seventeen Members..
44.. Since it can be fairly assumed that all three candidate countries
will become .Members of the Community during the lifetime of the next
Commission (1981-1985), the principle that the Commission should be
composed of not more than one Membe!' from each  Member State should be
applied from its inception in January 1981 , which coincides with the
entry of Greece.. Thus , for the period before further enlargement13....
the Presidency and the eight portfolios will be divided aIIlong ten
Members.. When Portugal and Spain join the Community, and the
number of Members of the Commission rises to twelve, the number of
portfolios will have to be increased by two by detaching Some
sectors of activity from what will by then be eight portfolios..
Indeed , the likely increase in the workload after this further
enlargement will justify increasing the number of portfolios to ten
wi thout impairing the quality of the administration and without
entailing an imbalcmce in sharing out duties among Members of the
Commission.. The choice of the sectors to be detached should be
made in the light of the development of the Commission s work and
of Community policy..
45.. If nevertheless governments nominate, for reasons of their own
a Commission of fourteen Members on the entry of Greece , and of
seventeen Members , or in any case of more than twelve Members , on the
entry of Spain and Portugal , it will still be necessary, for the
reasons given above , to maintain a ma:x:imum of eight and ten portfolios
respectively.. The Review :Body has carefully e:x:amined various ways of
sharing the work among the Members of the Commission in such a situation
and has come to the conclusion thc,t the only viable solution is for
four or five Commission~rs without portfolio (who would be the
second Members from thf; four or five big Member States) to assist
four or five of their colleagues in the management of portfolios
which involve a particularly taxing workload..
The Commission : germanence of the proposed structure
46.. The rule that there should be a maximum of ten portfolios must be
permanent  The content of these portfolios must be as stable as
possible and not subject to negotiation each time the Commission is
renewed.. If this rule were not followed , the administrative
structure corresponding to the portfolios would be subject to
periodic upheaval and its consequent unsettling effects.. The
stability of the portfolios does not , however , mean the same thing as
rigidi ty; the portfolios have been framed sufficiently broadly to
enable them to adapt to the evolution of the Commission s tasks..... 14 ...
In crder to. ensure co.ntinui ty, the divisicn cf portfclios shculd be
fo.rmally adopted by the Ccmmissicnas part of its rules cf prcoedure..
The Oonunissicn : appcintment of Members
47.. The clearly defined nature of the portfclios will roa.ke the
formation of the Ccnunission easier for the President-elect.. Indeed
the practice has already begun of ncminating the President in advance
cf the other Members of the Ccmmission and sounding him on the choice
of his ...uture colleagues. In our opinion, governments should nct
persist in seeking the appcintment cfthe candidate they first
prcpose if the Preaident-elect IIlakes an cbjection.. In that oase
they should nominate a second candidate. The wishes of the President
are particularly important when it comes to the Vice-President , who
with him will form the strengthened Presidency..
The Services : administrative Btruotur~
48. At present there are in the Commission 29 separate administrative
units , most of which are Directorates-General divided into. Directcrates
and Divisions.. Some of these administrative units have "horizontal"
duties (Legal Service , Bu.dget, Personnel and Administration etc..
while the others are "vertical" , i..e.. they are concerned with policy
sectors (agriculture , external relations , etc..
)..
49.. As in the case of the Commission itself , a limited number of
Services and. of Directors-General makes for solidari tyand
cccperaticn.. The principle cf dividing the college.s work into a
limited number of portfo.lios (leaving aside the horizo.ntalsectors)
sho.uld be applied in a similar way to the operational Directorates-
General.. The merger of several Direotorates-General into. a small
number of large administrative units would facilitate coordination
between related sectors , remove some obstacles to the mobility of
officials inside these units and co.ntribute to the stability and
efficiency of the organization...... 15 
50.. We therefore propose that in 1981 the vertical units should be
regrouped in 12 Directorates-General corresponding to 8 portfolios
each covering a sector of Community policy, the horizontal units
being put under the sole authority of the Presidency, as we have
already suggested.. In a second phase , on the entry of Spain and
Portugal , the number of these Directorates-General would be reduced
to 10 to coincide with the 10 portfolios which would then form the
final structure of the Conunission. (It should be added that within
the Directorates-General some .small services would retain a measure
of autonomy.. This two-phase approach is in order t.o avoid
re-grouping administrative units which would only have to b.e split
again later..
51.. The effect of the above proposals on the structure of the
Conunissionand. its Services , as from January 1981 , is .shown in
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The Se!,vices  ~.9Jd tipn jhe DJ_I'.~ctor~~!lJ~!,al
52. As was previously said, the position of the Director-General
should be given renewed weight. He should be solely responsible for
the management of his Directorate-General in direct and regular
contact with the CoIIlmissioner responsible for the sector; coordinate
its work with that of other Directorates-General , if necessary when no
agreement can be reached , 'by means of the coordination meetings chaired
by the Vice-President; playa central role in the appointment of his
staff; and be invited to attend Commission meetings when papers from
his department are being discussed. Moreover , it would be an
advantage and even indispensable in view of the reduced number of
CoIIlmissioners , if Directors-General could be entrusted by specific
mandate with high-level missions for representation or negotiation.
The links thus forged between the Commission itself , the Commissioner
and the Director-General (who is often of a different nationality
from the Commissioner) give an added European dimension to the
Commissioner s work.. It is clear that in order to perform this
function , the Director-General must be of the highest quality.
53.. The Director-General is of course responsible for directing the
conceptual work of his department , but he should not on that account
neglect his duties of management, which are equally important. 
should hold frequent meetings with his Directors and other officials
to ensure a continuous flow of guidance and of information in both
direotions , and should, with his Directors , take a personal interest
in staff matters.. He will of course rely heavily in this on his
personal assistants , who form a small administrative unit at the summit
of the Directorate-General , but the responsibility is his alone.
54.. This does not mean that Commissioners can abandon all contact with
their staff to the Directors-General.. Indeed , we have found that
officials are not sufficiently aware of the policy of the college on
the important issues of the day.. Members of the Commission should have
regular contacts at least with the senior officials in their sectors.
In addition , we propose that there should be regular informal meetings
between the Presidency and a small group of representatives of the
staff and of the unions and professional organizations , in order to fill
the gap referred to above..- 19 -
The Cabinets : role
55. Commission Members have had private offices , or Cabinets , since
the earliest days of the Community.. Although the Cabinet is not
traditional in all Member states , it seems particularly sui table in
the Commission conte:x:t. It would be difficult for individual
Commission Members to carry out their collegiate tasks if they could
not count on the assistance of competent , completely trustworthy
staff when dealing with the wide range of the Community s activities.
56.. Our analysis of the current situation has shown that although
the usefulness of these private offices is not disputed , some
aspects of their operation are starting to cause difficulties and
are even threatening to disrupt , quite substantially, the smooth
running of Commission Services: Cabinets "shielding" Members from
their Services , Chefs de cabinet usurping the responsibilities of
Directors-General'l meetings of  Chefs de cabinet (and indeed of
junior Cabinet staff) questioning proposals without consulting the
officials responsible for them, interference in appointment
procedures with undue weight being given to nationality factors
and so on..
57 e The strengthening of the role of Directors-General recommended
above should help to remedy this state of affairs. FUrther
improvement could be obtained by strict observance of the Cabinet 
threefold function;
(i) to act as the trusted assistant of the Member in order to
facilitate his management of his portfolio;
(ii) to help the Member in his personal political work, standing
in for him whenever he thinks it possible;
(Hi) to ensure that the Member is fully briefed on matters .covered
by his colleagues ' port:olios to enable him to meet the
demands of collective responsibility..... 20 
The Cabinets : staff
58.. The size of the Cabinets should be strictly liIIli ted and
Cabinet staff should be selected by the Commissioners theIIlselves.
Cabinet staff are either recruited from outside or seconded from
wi thin the institutions. There is no reason why Commission
offioialsshould not be reinstated in th~ir former posts at the
end of their secondment.. They should not , however , be entitled
to be appointed to a post on promotion without actually taking
it up. As for Cabinet staff brought in from outside , if they
wish to apply for appointment as .a permanent offioial , the same
procedures should apply to them as to other e:x:ternal candidates
for posts in the Commission (see paras.. 106 to 108 below).
The Cabinets : working methods
59.. If the function of a Cabinet is defined as above, the object of
the weekly meetings of Chefs de cabinet becomes quite specific , viz..
to prepare the ground for Commission meetings. The weekly meetings
of Chefs de cabinet which are chaired by the Secretary-General should
be attended by the Chefs de cabinet themselves or by their deputies
in case of absence. Directors-General or their representatives
should be present when matters falling within their competence are
being discussed.
60.. The purpose of the weekly meeting would then be 
(i) to review items on the Commission s agenda and decide which
items could be approved without further discussion (A items)
or subject to statements which the CoIDIllission could formally
note;
(ii) to establish, where appropriate , what minor amendments could
be made to a proposal to enable it to be adopted by the
Commission;- 21 -
(iii) on more sensitive issues , to provid.e as full a picture as
possible of the viewpoints expressed at the meeting, so that
each Member can contribute to the discussion from the outset
in full knowledge of the facts.
61.. It follows from the above that a matter which has been
properly coordinated beforehand can legitimately be settled by the
Chefs de cabinet. They should not however make changes to 
paper without consulting the relevant Director-General , and they
should not depart radically from its main policy line. If the
work of Chefs de cabinet cannot be kept wi thin these bounds, it
is clear either that preliminary coordination has not fulfilled
its purpose (a frequent occurrence at present which obliges
Chefs de cabinet to step outside their proper role in order to
fill the gap) or that issues are involved on which the Commission
itself must take a decision..- 22 -
Part Three : Administrative Policy
Introduotion
62. Unlike Member states, the Commission has a young administration,
which is still growing, having been formed in less than thirty years in
conditions which made precise long-term planning difficult.. Staff have
been recruited in waves , and the shape of the organization has been
deter.ained by the accretion of tasks"
63. This process is not yet over" In the ne:x:t five years the Community
will be enlarged to include first Greece and then Portugal and Spain"
The implications of this for the organization of the Commission s work
have been discussed above, but it will also be necessary to make
provisions for the recruitment of officials from those countries. 
believe that the reorganization which this will entail provides an
opportunity for ensuring that the EUropean Civil Service makes the
transition frOm a period of unplanned development to one in which it can
go forward on a more even keel, with a more rational and therefol'e more
efficient use of staff and more regular careers.
64.. The object of the Commission must be to make the IIlost efficient use
possible of the limited resources at its disposal" As we pointed out at
the beginning of this Report (see parao 10), the Commission seeks to
maintain a geographical balance among its staff" This is desirable not
so much to ensure an equilibrium at a given moment by earmarking posts
by nationality, but to benefit in a posit.ive, dynamic way from the
varied experience which officials of different nationalities can bring
and to achieve a balance over a period of time.. This is the only Wa::!
in which the Commission will maintain a uniformly high quality of staff,
if its role is to be effectively performed..
65" In the remainder of this Report, we propose some measures to deal
with special difficulties which will arise in the short term and others.... 
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which are designed to be of benefit in the lotlger term 1 . We should like
to emphasize that these measures are closely inter-related. If only
some measures, and not others, are put into fot-oe, not only will they
fail in their object but they could prove positively harmful.
Effioienoy of the or~nization
(i) Structures and organization of work
66. We have been struck by the large number of Divisions and
Specialised Services - the basic administrative units - in the structure
of the Commission services.. There are at present 339, of which 247 are
Divisions and 92 Speoialised Services.. These units 'are of ve~ unequal
size, the number of officials with conceptional duties - A officials -
in a unit ranging from one (the Head of the unit being the only A
official) to over 30.. It must be admitted that the varying nature of
duties performed necessitates units of differing sizes. This calls for
two remarks:
(a) asa general rule Divisions should not be set up with only
one or two Category A officials.. Of course, depending on the type of
its work a Division can legitimately include a considerable number of
B and C officials..
(b) we nevertheless believe that in many cases Divisions are too
small to allow effective staff management. The staff complement of a
Division should be such that it can be coordinated by a head who is able
to organize the work of those under him and report back to the level
above.
67. We therefore recommend that the Commission should conduct a  detailed
review of the organization of its departments with a view to reducinp:
the number of Divisions and Speciali~ed Services where necessary This
We have shown in footnotes the type of action required to put each
measure into effect (Commission decision, Council decision, amendment
of the Staff Regulations etc.
)..
Internal decision of the Commission.69..
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in t1lI'n would imply a reduction in the number of Directorat~s. We have
ourselves conducted a test review of one Directorate-General" and have
come to the conclusion that " without abandoning allY of the .aotivities at
present 'being carried out" the number of its Divisions and Speoialised
Servicesoan be reduced from 29 to 20 (a reduction of nearly one third)"
and the number of Directorates from 1 to 6.
68. The reduction of the nUlIlbar of' administrative units entails a
corresponding reduction in the number of Heads of units (IJeads of
Division or Heads of Specialised Services) and consequently in a certain
number of A3and .A4 posts in the list of posts. This reduction will not
present major difficulties if the following precautions are taken The
Heads of Speoialised Services are normally Principal Administrators
(A5/4) who can be relocated in the enlarged Divisions. Thearrangements
for early retirement and the disengagement of staff proposed later in
the Report " particularly in connection with the entry of Greece, will
make possible the necessary reduction of A3 posts. If in some special
cases this kind of arrangement seems inappropriate or is not applicable
the Commission will have to seek trans! tory arrangements until the new
rules for A3 officials , proposed in the conterl of career development
(para. 98)" are applicable.
The key to the efficient working of a streamlined system of thi.
type is greatly increased emphasis on  ~ement qualities It should
not be possible for anyone to be appointed Head of Division (and
a fortiori to a higher position) unless he has shown aptitude for
management " fostered by the Commission through sui table training
programmes. A Head of Division should also have had experience
throughout his career of several different sectors of the Commission
activities" acquired through an active policy of mobility (se~ para.. 92
below)" especially in the A5/4 career bracket.
10. In this conte:x:t the  Specialised ervJ..ces can serve a useful
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purpose. They can provide a convenient forum for testing the management
qualities of an official who appears suitable for appointment as Head of
Division. They can also enable the Commission to try out a new activity
before taking a decision on whether it merits setting up a Division.
Specialised Services should, however, be few in number in proportion to
full Divisions; the review proposed in para.. 67 above should make it
possible for theIIl to be considerably reduced.
71.. We have heard criticism frOIIl Commission officials themselves of the
standards of discipline
1 in the Commission Services.. We would remark
that in that case, the blame is as likely to lie with senior staff
failing to e:x:ercise adequate control as with their juniors with whom
fault is found.. A good manager should ensure that discipline is
observed, to the general satisfaction of all his staff. We believe that
an improvement in standards of management will bear fruit in this
respect too. The manager will be helped in his task if the matching of
staff to needs is carried out properly. as we have suggested in para. 76
below. Problems of discipline are less likely to arise if officials
are satisfied with the atmosphere in which they work, and if a more
effective system of reporting is properly applied, as we propose in
para. 81 below.
72. We have noted that some cases of absenteeism are more medical
questions than a matter for the rules of discipline. 
Wi th this in
mind we recommend that the Commission should review the present rules
for the application of the invalidity scheme.
(11) Allocation of staff
73. The staff of the Commission does not appear to be e:x:cessive in
number, but it is badly distributed among different sectors. This means
that some people are underworked. while others are grossly overworked.
The only body which should arbitrate on conflicting claims for staff
made by different sectors is the college itself. Bu.t the Commission' s
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e:x:isting procedures are not suited to dealing with this type of
question in the absence of a proper arbitration procedure. We have
therefore attempted to make proposals for changing these procedures so
that the Commission can efficiently carry out its functions in this
area..
74.. First of all, we consider that. without going so far as to introduce
a system of management by objectives which would be uns~i ted to an
institution which has a substantial policy-making function and must be
in a pod tion to react flexibly to changing circumstanoes , a degree of
work programming must be organized in the Directorates-Genera1 .. We
therefore propose that within the framework of the annual programme that
the Commission adopts and presents to 'theEnropean Parliament each
Directorate-General should establish its work programme for the year
setting the guidelines for all its activities and determining its
precise objectives and schedule..
75. It would be for the strengthened Presidency to check each year that
these programmes are properly prepared in terms of internal consistency
and of compliance with the Commission s priorities, and to arrange for
coordination. The full CoIIlIDission could be consulted if necessa~.. The
review would erlend also to activities undertaken in pursuance of past
decisions (and even of Community legislation) whose continued utility
may with the passage of time be open to doubt; proposals "ould be put
to the Commission for revoking the decision and discontinuing the
activity.. In practice these tasks would be handled by the Vice-President,
assisted by the Secretariat-General.
76.. The strengthened Presidency (generally the Vice-President) would
likewise be responsible for preparing and proposing to the Commission
measures for improving the deployment of its manpower and other resources..
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In the preparation .of these decisions the Presidency wauld be assisted
by the  Screening Graup1 set up in the Directarate-General far Pereannel
and Administration, which already daes valuable work in regularly
revie\ving the funotianing .of the Services" In future it cauld base its
review bath on priorities decided by the Coromission (aoting in
accordance with instructi.ons fram the Vice-President) and .on the
Directorate-General's pragramme  at  w.ork (see above). It w.ould have 
be given erlra staff to cape with its erlra respond bili ties.
77. As regards requests far additional staff which the Cammissian makes
to the Council, after preparation by the Vice-President, we pr.op.ose that
the C.oromission shauld set up an  erlemal bady1 composed .of three members
appointed by the Caromissian, possibly after consulting the Court .of
Audi tors 11 far a period of three years, renewable.. The duties .of this
body would be to give an opinion on requests for additianal staff which
the Commissian intends to make to the budgetary authari ty, after due
consideratian .of e:x:isting staff resources throughaut the Caromissian
Services. It is not praposed that this bady shauld appear before the
European Parliament .or the Cauncil, but its written apinian should, an
request , be annexed ta the Cammission propasals..
78.. Having thus recast its warking methads, the Caromissian may expect
its requests far staff ta be thoroughly e:x:amined by the budgetary
authority 11 and for thepositian taken by the budgetary authari ty to be
properly reasoned. We nate that the Parliament has adopted the
successful method .of appointing a Rapporteur to investigate the
Commissian s requests in infarmed detail.. We hope that the .organs .of
the Council will adopt working methods which in the future will make far
better ooaperation between the Council , the Parliament and the
Commissian 
79. As regards the Cammission, it is nat sufficient to provide
machinery ta enable posts to be transferred to priority sectors; it is
Internal decision of the Commission.
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essential that the right person should be moved to the right job. In
the small Connnission a.dJninistration of the early days, when officials
were well known to each other, it was not difficult to lay one s hands
on the right person to fill a particular post. Because of the greater
size of the Commission staff today and the complexity of its work, this
is no longer possible.. We therefore p.ropose that a  central staff
re~ster should beset up which ahould list official fa qualifications
training and experience and their aptitude for particular jobs.. This
will not only encourage the better use of staff available but by making
possible an active policy of staff mobility improve career planning and
increase job satisfaction..
80" The corolla~ of the central staff register is a series of  job
descriptions , which will be drawn up in the light of the tasks of the
respective administrative units. Wi thout this full exploitation of the
register is not possible.. At present, jobs are described only in the
more general terms required for the publication of vacancies.
81. The remaining tool which should be put at the disposal of the
Vice-President and the screening group is a better system of  staff
repo.rting .. Reports at present are not informative. Staff can be
graded only as average, above average or below average" The Commission
has recently adopted a measure with the effect of increasing these
categories of appreciations from three to five to allow a more finely
tuned assessment of staff.. The reports should also give staff the
possibility of commenting on their work and expressing preferences for
their career development. A system of double reporting should be
followed, whereby the principal report is made by the official'
immediate hierarchical superior and a further report added by his ne:x:t
superior but one.. It goes without saying that the more elaborate system
of reporting which is envisaged will not be effective unless it is
properly used by those responsible for making reports. It is ultimately
in the interest of no-one, not even the official being reported on, if
favourable or non-committal reports are made, when these are not deserved.
~ --
Internal decision of the Commission.- 29 -
Careers
(i) !!.e.e.I1li 1m~ni
82. It is clearly important that the Commission should reorui t the
best staff. While it is acknowledged that in general the standard of
staff recruited through open competitions is high, a n1.1Inber 
improvements to the current procedures and greater flexibility in the
eligibili ty requirements would make for fuller attainment of the above
objective and for a better geographical balance from the start..
83. Improvements to the recruitment procedures should be made above
all in the following aspeots:
- advertising of competitions in the different Member States 
particularly through more regular contacts with universities and
public authorities designed to make the advertising more effective;
- greater decentralization of the places in which the tests
are conducted;
- appointment of outside assessors so that the diverse national
cultures are better represented: they would assist the single
selection board at all stages of the competition process but e:;pecially
on questions of eligi bili ty and in the preparation of the reasoning
test..
84.. Communi ty staff are reorui ted for the most part by open
competitions at present organized separately by the various institutions..
This has a n1.1Inber of disadvantages both for the institutions and for
candidates. The Commission should explore the possibility of organizing
joint competitions with the other institutions
2 for the recruitment
of certain categories of staff  .An effort should also be made, with
the agreement of the Council , to arrive at some measure of planning
as regards competitions, or at the possibility of early recruitments
in anticipation of likely increases in staff numbers  This would in
Internal decision of the Commission.
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many cases cut out the lengthy waiting periods imposed on those on
the list of sui table candidates which frequently lead the best of them
to withdraw their applications altogether.
85. Moreover, the Commission should not deny itself access to an
important part of the highly-educated labour market. At present , open
competitions for administrators are restricted to university graduates
either with two years ' professional experience or with postgraduate
qualifioations.. This effectively e:x:cludes young graduates from
entering Category A. Nor can they take the Category B examination,
from which they are excluded by the mere fact of having a degree,
which in i helf seems unfair.. They are thus completely lost t-o the
Commission.
86. We therefore propose that there be a change of policy to allow
the possibility of !'ecruiting graduates to  Category B In Category A
the present system should be continued, except that Grade A8 should be
revived as the starting grade for new recruits. Competitions would be
open to candidates aged less than 28 with high-level university
qualifications or some form of working experience since graduation.
Recruitment to Grade A7 would be available only in really special cases
for candidates with proven experience or e:x:oeptional qualifications..
Such candidates could be eligible and recruited between 28 and 32..
81. It has been objected that graduates in Category B will soon be
dissatisfied with their work and Glamour for transfer to Category A.
It is clear that candidates for Category B must be left in no doubt
about the type of work they will be asked to do. :But we note that in
some cases B officials are already doing work of greater responsibility
than some junior A officials.
88. At the same time the conditions for transfer from  Category :B to
Category A must be clearly set out. The possibility of transfer exists
at present t but is little used.. A fixed percentage of the annual intake
into Category A should be reserved for established :B officials 9 whether
Amendment of the Staff Regulations.
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they aI's graduates or non-graduates , who have shown their aptitude for
car!'ying out Category A duties and passed appropriate tests. 
diffioul ty may arise here from the fact that entry in Category A should
be at the lowest grade, while some :B officials may be earning more than
bottom grade A officials. Practical arrangements should  be  made to
ensure that such officials who transfer to Catego.ry A do not l~se by
it financially.
89. Following reoruitment , the new official undergoes a  probation
period1 of nine months for Category A and si:x: months for other
categories. This is not sufficient for the employer to make an informed
judgment about the qualities of the official. It should be increased
to one year in all cases.. Inaddi tion, we have observed that
probationer officials rarely fail to be established after their
probation period. Those responsible for reporting on them should take
their duties very seriously and not hesitate to recommend that a
trainee who is not up to the mark should not be made a permanent
official..
ii ) Mo bi Ii 
90. one of the gravest drawbacks of the present administrative
structure is that it positively discourages staff from moving from
one job to another and thus acquiring the variety of experience which
we have said must be a condition for appointment t.o positions of
higher responsibility. An official who wishes to acquire varied
experience finds that his promotion prospects are impaired as a result
while an official who prefers to remain in one post can successfully
resist attempts by his superiors to move him to another.
91.. Mobili ty
2 must be made a right and a duty. In the .oareer brackets
A8-A6 , after the expiry of a minimum period (say three years) in any one
assignment an official should automatically be put on a transfer list
and have the right to change jobs if he wishes. On the other hand, he
Amendment to the Staff Regulations..
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should not be eligible fo!' promotion to A5 if he has not had
experience in at least two assignments" An official can thus no longer
be prevented by his superiors from moving to another post . and has a
strong incentive to do so"
92" Mobility should also be encouraged in the A5/A4 career bracket,
al though it would not be appropriate to put into force as infle:x:ible
a system as is suggested for the lower grades. It should be recalled
that diversity of experience at this stage of an official's career has
been proposed as a condition for appointment as Head of Division (see
para" 69 above)"
93. In connection wi th mobility, emphasis should continue to be placed
on adequate staff  training , especially vocational training, laI1gU.age
training and management training" In particular, the existing exchange
scheme between Commission officials and national civil servants should
be reinforced..
(iii) Career development
94.. The career development of the Category A official suffers from
four factors which are unrelated, but whose cumulative effect is to
make it irregular and even haphazardo These factors are the uncertainty
from year to year about the number of posts which will be authorised by
the budgetary author! ty, the irregular shape of the career pyramid
caused by successive waves of recruitment, direct recruitment from
outside in the intermediate and higher grades and the fact that the
Commission s own promotion procedures cause more rapid promotion in
expanding Directorates-General and less rapid promotion in stationary
ones.. (The situation of :B and C officials is slightly better in that
their promotion procedures are more centralised, but they obviously
remain subject to the other oonstraints.. The series of proposals which
follow are designed to achieve the object, mentioned in the introduction
to this section, of ensuring the transition from a period of unplanned
development to a steadier one with better career opportunities..
95.. Grade A8should be used once more for the recruitment of aspiring
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officials. The average A official W s career beginning in Grade A8 should
bring him to Grade A4 at the retiring age of 65. There should be, a
career plan" which would in general allow the average official to I'each
the last step in Grade A4 between 60 and 65, when he can choose between
retirement at the official retiring age or early retirement.  A more
regular promotion POlicy
i of this type would give these officials right
up to the end of their career salary increases linked to length of
service as provided for by the system of two-yeaI' steps.
96. To achieve this object, we propose that an indicative career
profile should be applied showing the age I'anges in which  the average
official can normally be promoted. We propose the following ranges
for admission to grades:
1\4
up to 28 years
28 to 32 years
32 to 38 years
36 to 44 years
44 to 50 years
97. We do not of course intend that this career profile should be
the norm ,for all A officials.. :Because .01 the shape of the career
pyramid, not all A staff can reach positions of A3 and above.. The
particularly able should be promoted more rapidly than the norm, in
order to enable them to be appointed  A3,  A2 and eventually Ai at a
sufficiently early age.. Similarly, staff who are below the average
be promoted more slowly than the norm, so that they reach.A4, if at
all, shortly before retirement.
should
98.. We said above (pax:ao 69) that appointments to the post of Head
of Division (GradeA3) should be confined to officials who have shown
apti tude for management.. Other officials may well not be suited for
management duties as Heads of Division, but be very capable of carrying
out other duties, for example of conception, of a sufficient level of
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responsibility to merit an A3 post. Widely e:x:perienced and highly
qualified officials in a given sector can IIlake an important contribution
to the work of the Commission Services in a senior position, which is not
a position of management responsibility. To make the best possible use
of the capacities of these officials, we propose that measures should be
taken to allow the  appointment of A3 officials to posts within .a Division
and under the author! ty of a Head of Division . We wish to emphasize that
appointment to A3 posts of this type should not be seen as a reward for
a long career, but as involving the carrying out of duties at a higher
level of responsibility than that previously e:x:ercised by the official
ooncerned. The importance of precise job descriptions , referred to in
para. 80 above, will be easily understood in this conterl.
99. This more ~egular promotion policy should be put into effect through
the e:x:isting promotion and appointment prooedures , which ho'Wever the
Review :Body proposes should be changed at two points.
100. For promotion from A6 to A5 , we propose that a selection
committee should be established, made up of a nwnber of Directors-General
by rotation but including the Director-General for Personnel and
Administration, which would periodically draw up a promotion table listing
in order of men t officials deserving promotion (including the
qualification of varied e:x:perience, see para. 91 above). From this list
Directorates-General will be able to select the officials best suited
to the vacancies to be filled. This ensures that an official's chances
of promotion are not damaged by the accident of working in a particula~
Directorate-General , and at the same time leaves Directorate.s-General
an element of choice in their staff, which is important as a management
tool"
101.. All officials on the promotion list should normally be promoted
within two years from the date of their first appearance on it, unless
there is a change in their behaviour after that date.. If an official
on the promotion list is repeatedly passed over for promotion by the
failure of Direotorates-General to appoint him to a post in the higher
~endment of the Staff Regulations..
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grade, the Directorate-General for Personnel and Administration, under
the author! ty of the Vice-President, should intervene to determine the
reason and take suitable action.
For the ap~ointment to A3 posts a selection committee should
be set up composed of the Secretary-General, the DireotoJ:".oGeneral of
the Directorate-General in which the appointIIlent is to be made, the
Direotoz-General for Personnel and Administration, a third, "neutral"
Director-General by :l'otation and the Chef de cabinet of the
Vice-President. This Committee, which will norIIla,lly be chaired by
the Secretary-General, will draw up for the Presidency a list in
order of preference of Commission officials who are sui table for
appointment.. In the case of e:x:ternal candidates, the Committee would
present a "liste d tapti tude .. The Presidency, together with the
appropriate Member, would make a proposal to the Commission, which
would decid.
(iv) Introduotion of outside e:x:perience to the Commission
103.. In the earlier days of the Community, staff were recruited at
all lev~ls, and therefore brought with them e:x:perience acquired 
other walks of life which was very valuable to the Commission. Now
that the European civil service is becoming more stable, and staff are
making their life t s career in the service of the Commission, this
advantage is lost.. If the Commission is not to become increasingly
divorced from e:x:perience of the world outside, it is essential that
it should be able to benefit from a current of staff having such
e:x:perience.. Such people may come from national administrations
both sides of industry or other sectors , although most of them will
probably prove to be national civil servants. In the latter case,
the Commission will benefit from the more informed view of its
activities which they will take back to their home administrations at
the end of their time in the Commission.. The proposals which follow
are designed to achieve this object.. It goes without saying that they
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have been framed in such a way as to maintain the complete independence
of Commission staff from outside control and not to impair the career
prospects of established staff.
104.. Appointments at A3 are frequently influenced by poli tical or
geographical considerations and at this level staff inevitably have
to be recruited from outside. As there are no special rules like
those for Grades A1 and A2, these recruitments are made by devious
procedures , the appointee being brought in on a tempor~ contract
and subsequently established as a full official by means o.f an
internal competition at which because of his special experience he
is sure of being suocessful.. A similar procedure also operates for
appointment of outsiders .at A5/A4, which has a generally disruptive
effect on career prospects.. These purely formal competitions - the
so-called "rigged competitions" - are understandably unpopular with
staff; and they do not even provide a guarantee that the Commission
will select the best possible candidate..
105. The ai tuation ought to be remedied by a solution along the
following lines; the Commission would then have access to valuable
outside e:x:periencewhile safeguarding the interests of staff already
in the house by complYing more closely not so much with the letter
as wi ththe spirit of the established recruitment procedures:
(i) possibility of direct recruitment from outside at A3,
subject to a strictly limited av~ual quota;
(n) as for Grades A8 to .A4, enernal recruitment, only to
the lowest grades  to be e:x:clusively by open competition, and
subsequent appointment to higher grades to be solely by internal
promotion;
(iii) internal competitions to be open e:x:clusively to
established officials.
The changes that we propose for this purpose are set out in
the paragraphs below.106.
101..
- 31 -
The procedure laid down by  Article 29(2) of the Staff
Regulations for Grades A 1 and A2 should be extended to Grade A3 but
applicable to a ma:x:imum of 20% of all appointments to that grade in
any oneyear .. The appointment to permanent posts of Cabinet staff
(para.. 58) would be included in this quota. The posts should be
properly advertised throughout the Community and applications
should be considered by the selection committee proposed at
paragraph 102 above. The probationary period should be one year.
It is essential that the officials thus reorui ted should be at
least as well qualified as officials already serving with the
Commission. Appointments to all other A3 posts should be reserved
for established offioials.
Appointments in the A8-.A4 range should be made only 1u
e:x:ternal recruitment, only to the lowest grades, through open
competi tion, and by subsequent intern3..1 promotion to higher grades..
To achieve this , it should be made clear that  access to internal
oompeti tions (at all levels .and for all categories) is  restricted
to established officials .. This will put an end to the purely
formal competitions.. The only e:x:ception to this rule would be the
use of Article 29 para. 2 of the Staff Regulations to reorui t from
outside to jobs requiring highly specialised qualifications, within
the present strict interpretation of the Court of Justice.
Ex:ceptional appointments of this kind should be closely controlled
by the e::rlsting committee whose duty it is to ascertain that a
request for specialised staff reflects a real need, and that there
is sufficient publicity to attract a good range of candidates..
(~his does not apply to the scientific and technical staff..
Amendment of the Staff Regulations and internal decision of the
Commission..
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Lastly, the Commission could obtain the servic.es of A officials
recruited from outside for strictly limited periods. They could be
appointed on temporary contracts to new temporary posts1 created
specifically for the purpose by the budgetary autho:dty These
posts would generally be in the A5/ A4 career bracket and paid direct
by the Commission and would be renewed annually a third or a
quarter at a tiIIle, depending on the duration of the contracts which
would be between two and five years" As a result of the restriction
to permanent staff of access to internal competitions, they would
not be able, as at present, to beCOIIle permanent offioials.. In
order to avoid difficult personal problems, the Commission ~ould,
in the case of officials from national administrations or public
enterprises, have to e:x:traot from the employer specific undertakings
about the conditions in which the official would return to his
employment on the e:x:priy of his contract with the Commission. lIB
in the case of directly recruited A3 officials, proper selection
procedures must be applied to ensure that the temporary staff are
suitably qualified..
For this programme to be carried out the budgetary authority
would have to add each year for the first years of the operation of
the scheme a fued number of temporary A5/A4posts to the
Commission s table .of posts These posts could only be used
for this type of recruitment. After the preliminary period the
departure of temporary staff as their contracts e:x:pired would
ensure that the system functioned normally.. For example, assuming
that the average length of contract is four years, the addition of
50 posts a year for a period of four years would result in 200
temporary staff, about 20% of the total number of A5/A4 Commission
offioials.. To e:x:ceed this proportion would distort the European
character of the Community administration.
Amendment of the Staff Regulations and internal decision of the
Comroission"
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It should be made olear that this operation is entirely
different in nature from the employment in the Commission Services
of  national experts , who are seconded from their home
administrations for periods ranging from one month to one year.
These e.:x:perts, who continue to be paid by their hoIIle governments
but receive a daily subsistence allowance from the Commission are
mainly employed in sectors requiring technical e:x:pertise like the
oust oms union and agriculture. In 1979 the Commission will have
employed 120 such e:x:perts. It is possible that the work done by
some of these e:x:perts will be able to be done instead by temporary
staff recruited under the arrangements proposed in paras. 108 and
109; IIluch of the work. however, is of a short-term technical
nature and will not be affected by these arrangements. The
Commission should, however, ensure that the use made of national
e:x:perts does not rise significantly above its present level , or
again the risk is run of distorting the European character of the
administration.
(v) Staff s'tructure
We have already said that the staff of the Commission has
been recruited in waves over a fairly short period. The result is
a very uneven age distribution and, until 1985"e6. a fairly limited
number of retirements. In Category A, the number of retirements
will be 120, which is totally insufficient to keep up a normal rate
of promotions. From 1986 the number of retirements each year will
rise considerably.
Internal decision of the Commission.112.
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In order to absorb this abnormal and temporary blockage of
oareers, the Commission has already proposed to the Council an
amendment to the Staff Regulations which will, in particular
facili tate retirement at 60 instead of 65 Al though it is not
easy to estimate the nutnber of voluntary departures which will
result, we believe that this arrangement, which will also bring
down the average age of staff, is a step in the right direction
but will still not provide a complete solution to careeI' problems.
Furthermore, just when the effect of this arrangement on
career development tells, the reduction in the nutnber of
administrative units we propose will lead to a narrowing of career
possibilities 
We believe therefore that it is indispensable to make  further
temporary arrangements to remain in force until 1986 These
would consist in giving A3 and A4 officials who have been in the
highest step in their grade for at least two years and are aged
55 or over early retirement with an allowance worth 70% of their
basic salary; at 65 they would become eligible for a pension
calculated in such a way that the period during which they
received an allowance was reckoned as if they had remained at work
It should be noted, however, that the same period will see
enlargement to include Greece first of all, and in all probability
Spain and Portugal later.. As matters stand, it is not possible to
foresee the effeut of this enlargement on staffing levels.. It is
nevertheless clear that the arrival of these new meIIlber countries
would upset the arrangements described above if it were entirely
at the expense of vacancies in the e:x:isting staff posts.
See Anne:x: II..
Decision of the budgetary authority.
ThiS arrangement differs from that made at the last enlargement
qy being strictly 11mi ted to officials at the end of their career
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116. The budgetary authority should therefore create the posts
needed to take in the new nationalities and make sure that the
posts are properly distributed so that the grade pyramid is
maintained. Failing this, the reform of career structure will
be jeopardized. A review each year by the Council and the
Commission together should make it possible to judge whether the
structure of this pyramid is in accordance with the care.
development we have recommended..
117 . The combined effect of the arrangements for the release of
staff and the solutions found by the budgetary authority for the
problems of enlargement should make it possible to bring career
development within the profile we have recommended in para.. 96.
It will then be up to the Commission to apply this profile by means
of a regular promotion policy according to the ranges for admission
to grades we propose 
1 . This promotion policy and the use of Grade A8
should normally bring officials to retiring age (60 to 65), with
regular two-yearly steps right up to retirement.
118. If after this reform the Commission indulges in a batch of
rapid promotions, once retirements as a result of age structure
become ,more frequent, it will fall again into the vicious circle
and a diffioul t operation in both financial and human terms will
have been to no avail..
119.. We should like the Commission to take contact with the
other institutions about the way to make sure that career
developIIlent is coherent as between one institution and another.
Internal decision of the Commission.120..
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Staff in other categories
We acknowledge that we have had to devote most of our
attention to questions concerning Category A staff. This is
because the questions of organization and operation that we were
asked to consider mainly involve policy matters handled by
staff in that category. We a:re aware that there are probleros at
other levels and for other Services. Since we could not go into
all these aspects in the time available to fulfil our task, w~
recommend that the Commission should make arrangements for these
problems to be studied as soon as possible in a perfectll
objective way.- 43-
ANNEX. I
Permanent staff of the Coromission e:x:cluding reset:l.rchstaff but including
language staff.
Category (md grade Pennanent posts
A 1
A 2 117
A 3 318
A 4 607
A 5 501
A 6 342
A 7 237
A 8
Total 2 145
:B 1 415
:B 2 462
:B 3 461
:B 4 243
:B 5 142
Total 723
441
977
1 004
C 4 281
C 5
Total 197
D 1 185
D 2 161
D 3
D 4
Total 423
LA 3
LA 4 207
LA 5 440
LA 6 265
LA 7 284
LA 8
Total 214
Grand Total 302- 44-
1llicplanatory note to Anne:x: I
Category A comprises eight grades 1 , divided into career brackets
ordinarily containing two grades each:lOr staff engaged in
administrative and advisory duties which require university education
or equivalent professional experience.
CategoryB comprises five grades, divided into career brackets
ordinarily containing two grades each for staff engaged in executive
duties which require an advanced level of secondary education or
equivalent professional experience.
Category C comprises five grades, divided into career brackets
ordinarily containing two grades each for staff engaged in clerical
duties which require secondary education or equivalent professional
experience.
Category D comprises four grades , divided into career brackets
ordinarily containing two grades each for staff engaged in rnanual
or service duties which require prirnary education, if necessary
supplemented by sorne technical training.
Posts of translators and interpreters are grouped in a Language
Service designated by the letters L/A, comprising six grades
equivalent to Grades 3 to 8 of Category A and divided into career
brackets ordinarily containing two grades each.
A 2
Direct or-General
Direct or
Head of Divis ion A 3
A 4 )
A 5 )
A 6 )
A 7 )
A 8
Principal Administrator
Administrator
Assistant Administrator- 45 -
AENEX I I
The Commission's proposals to the Council may be summarised
as follows:
Bonus on pension for officials who leave at 60.
Voluntary purchase of additional pension rights.
3.. Voluntary retirement between 50 and 60 without
reduction of pension rights for selected officials
on the occasion  of  the entry of a new Member State.